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Admiralty
John P. Kavanagh, Jr.*
The cases discussed herein represent decisions from the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, as well as district
courts within the Circuit, issued in 2021. While not an all-inclusive list
of maritime decisions during that timeframe, the Author identifies and
provides summaries of key rulings of interest to the maritime
practitioner.1
I. SHIPOWNER’S LIMITATION OF LIABILITY
Two related companies, Skanska USA Civil Southeast, Inc. and
Skanska USA, Inc. (collectively Skanska), were under contract with the
Florida Department of Transportation to build new spans for the
Pensacola Bay Bridge, a “major transportation link between the cities of
Pensacola and Gulf Breeze, and between Escambia and Santa Rosa
counties.”2 Skanska’s work required the use of multiple barges “to
transport workers and materials to and from the work site.”3 In fact,
there were fifty-five barges on site in September of 2020.4
Hurricane Sally made landfall on September 16, 2020, as a Category
2 storm near Gulf Shores, Alabama.5 This hurricane was approximately
thirty-five miles west of Pensacola Bay Bridge. Twenty-seven of the
fifty-five Skanska barges broke loose, causing significant damage to the
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1. For an analysis of admiralty law during the prior Survey period, see John P.
Kavanagh, Jr., Admiralty, Eleventh Circuit Survey, 72 MERCER L. REV. 997 (2021).
2. In re Skanska USA Civil Southeast Inc., No. 3:20cv5980/LAC/HTC, 2021 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 251691, at *10 (N.D. Fla. 2021).
3. Id. at *10–11.
4. Id.
5. Id. at *10.
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bridge and other properties in and around the area.6 Skanska filed an
admiralty complaint under the Limitation of Vessel Owners Liability
Act in the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Florida.7
In re Skanska8 is an interesting case because it contains a thorough
discussion of a limitation claim in the context of anticipated heavy
weather, with the interplay of presumed fault under the Lousiana
Rule.9 Generally, the Lousiana Presumption arises when a moving
vessel strikes a stationary object; the moving vessel is presumed at
fault.10 This evidentiary device shifts the burden of persuasion to the
offending vessel.11 To overcome its presumed fault, the vessel’s interests
must demonstrate that the allision was the fault of the stationary
object, that the offending vessel acted with reasonable care under the
circumstances, or that the allision was an unavoidable accident.12 Here,
Skanska essentially argued that (1) it was caught unaware by the
arrival of Hurricane Sally, given the forecast track leading up to the
storm’s arrival; (2) efforts to secure the barges ahead of the storm were
reasonable; and (3) Hurricane Sally was a vis major, an unexpected and
unforeseeable risk against which all reasonable precautions would not
have prevented the loss.13
The court walked through the National Hurricane Center’s (NHC)
warnings for the five days before Hurricane Sally’s landfall on
September 16, 2020.14 While less than certain, it was clear that the
Pensacola area was at risk on (at least) September 11, 2020:
In fact, as is shown by the entirety of the NHC advisories from
Friday afternoon [September 11, 2020] to Wednesday morning
[September 16, 2020] when Hurricane Sally made landfall, the
Pensacola Bay area was at all times either in the cone of the storm’s

6. Id. at *11.
7. Id. at *9 (citing 46 U.S.C. §§ 30501–30512 (2006)).
8. In re Skanska USA Civil Southeast Inc., No. 3:20cv5980/LAC/HTC, 2021 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 251691, at *1 (N.D. Fla. 2021).
9. See id. at *23 (discussing the “Louisiana Presumption,” or the “Louisiana Rule.”).
10. Id. at *23–24.
11. Id. at *24.
12. Id. (citing Bunge Corp. v. Freeport Marine and Repair, Inc., 240 F.3d 919, 923
(11th Cir. 2001)).
13. Id. at *24–25, *31–33, *43.
14. Id. at *33.
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predicted path or was under a watch or warning for tropical storm
winds or greater.15

With respect to the second argument, security of barges, the court
pointed out that Skanska actually had a detailed “Hurricane
Preparedness Work Plan” (Hurricane Plan).16 The plan called for
Skanska to move its barges to a designated location (Butcherpen Cove
or Bayou Chico) once an approaching storm posed a sufficient threat.17
Rather than implement the plan and move the barges to the designated
area(s), Skanska elected to secure them to pilings near the bridge.18
This turned out to be a disastrous decision, but the court pointed out
that, “while failure to abide by the Plan might violate the terms of that
contract [the Florida DOT contract], it does not of its own force
establish negligent conduct, which is the concern of this litigation.”19
Going past the four corners of the contract, however, the court
concluded that the safe harbor locations identified therein would have
provided “substantially more storm protection than the pilings next to
the bridge that Skanska used.”20 After a thorough analysis, the court
concluded that Skanska’s decision to use piling stations near the
worksite was negligent.21
Skanska’s final argument to exculpate itself from liability was the
force majeure or vis major nature of Hurricane Sally.22 Skanska claimed
the presumption of fault under the Louisiana Rule was rebutted
because, despite all appropriate and reasonable efforts, Hurricane Sally
was “an inevitable force that caused the breakaway of its barges.”23 The
court again rejected this argument, noting that Skanska’s negligence in
failing to take reasonable precautions prevented it from successfully
utilizing the vis major defense.24
Finally, having concluded that negligence was demonstrated,
Skanska could not establish any lack of privity or knowledge with
respect to the acts or omissions constituting negligence.25 This is the
second step of a limitation action; that is, to determine whether or not
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id.
Id. at *17–18.
Id. at *18.
Id. at *17.
Id. at *27.
Id. at *28.
Id. at *30.
Id. at *43.
Id.
Id. at *44.
Id. at *46.
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Skanska was able to limit its liability to the value of the vessels
involved.26 “Here, Skanska must be able to demonstrate that it had no
knowledge of the acts of negligence or was not in privity with them.”27
Skanska could not carry its burden of proof with respect to this charge
as the negligence precipitating the loss “sprung wholly from executive
decision-making that resulted in the failure to take reasonable
measures to protect its barges from the impending storm.”28 Skanska
was unable to establish the necessary lack of privity or knowledge and
was therefore unable to limit its liability to the value of the barges.29
At the conclusion of its order, the district court dismissed the
limitation complaint and lifted the injunction against the various state
court actions related to the barge breakaway.30 The limitation
claimants were thus able to return to their original choice of forum and
pursue claims arising out of the September 16, 2020 maritime
casualty.31
II. CRUISE LINE PASSENGER CLAIMS
The Eleventh Circuit reiterated that a cruise ship passenger need not
show the vessel owner had actual or constructive knowledge of a
risk-creating condition for claims premised on vicarious liability or
employee negligence.32 A cruise ship passenger, Joann Yusko, was
injured during a “Dancing with the Stars” activity aboard the
Norwegian Cruise Line (NCL) vessel, Norwegian Gem. For the activity,
Yusko was paired with a crewmember and professional dancer, Michael
Kaskie. During their performance, Kaskie let go of Yusko, and the
sixty-four-year-old lady fell and struck her head, suffering a traumatic
brain injury resulting from the fall.33
A suit was filed against the vessel owner, NCL (Bahamas) Ltd.34
However, the district court granted summary judgment for the cruise
line, holding that Yusko failed to demonstrate the ship owner had
actual or constructive knowledge of the risk-creating condition that

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. at *45.
Id.
Id. at *46.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Yusko v. NCL (Bah.), Ltd., 4 F.4th 1164, 1166 (11th Cir. 2021).
Id.
Id.
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caused the passenger’s injury, namely, “Kaskie’s allegedly negligent
dancing.”35
The Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that maritime negligence
claims preceding on theories of vicarious liability—as opposed to claims
involving direct liability against a ship owner—do not require a
showing that the vessel owner was aware of the hazard.36 The court
explained that NCL erroneously conflated “the very different concepts
of direct and vicarious liability.”37 Maritime law requires a vessel owner
to exercise the duty of ordinary care to prevent injury to passengers.38
The direct breach of this duty by the vessel owner results in liability for
injuries caused to passengers.39 Pursuant to the doctrine of vicarious
liability, however, the “innocent” ship owner can still be held liable for
the negligence of its employees: “When the tortfeasor is an employee,
the principle of vicarious liability allows ‘an otherwise non-faulty
employer’ to be held liable ‘for the negligent acts of that employee acting
within the scope of employment.’”40
The Yusko decision would likely open up a host of issues, allowing
claims to advance via allegations of vicarious liability or employee
negligence absent the requirements of actual or constructive notice of a
shipboard hazard. After all, is every hazardous condition not ultimately
traced back to an act or omission of an employee? The court in Yusko
acknowledged this conundrum but was unpersuaded by the argument.41
Interestingly, in a decision issued at the end of 2021, the Southern
District of Florida squarely addressed this issue.42 The plaintiff, Sherri
Britt, was a passenger aboard the Carnival Glory when she slipped and
fell on an exterior staircase.43 She filed a lawsuit against Carnival that
contained five counts, including an allegation of “negligence against
Defendant for the acts of its employees based on vicarious liability

35. Id.
36. Id. at 1167.
37. Id. at 1169.
38. Id. at 1168.
39. Id. (citing inter alia Keefe v. Bahama Cruise Line, Inc., 867 F.2d 1318 (11th Cir.
1989)). Keefe also involved an injury to a dancing passenger. However, in that case the
passenger fell on a wet surface while dancing and sued the vessel owner for (essentially)
premises liability (negligently maintaining its floor). Keefe, 867 F.2d at 1320 (cited in
Yusko, 4 F.4th at 1168).
40. Yusko, 4 F.4th at 1169 (quoting Langfitt v. Fed. Marine Terminals, Inc., 647 F.3d
1116, 1121 (11th Cir. 2011)).
41. Id. at 1170.
42. Britt v. Carnival Corp., No. 1:21-cv-22726-KMM, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 248263
(S.D. Fla. 2021).
43. Id. at *2.
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(Count V).”44 Carnival moved to dismiss Count V for failure to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted.45
Citing Yusko, the district court agreed, reasoning that the plaintiff
essentially sought to hold Carnival responsible for its employees’
“negligent mopping.”46 “At bottom, the employees’ negligent mopping
allegedly created a dangerous condition on the premises of the ship . . . .
Therefore, the employees’ negligent mopping is in fact a claim for
negligent maintenance of Defendant’s premises and negligent failure to
warn.”47 The district court rejected a broad reading of Yusko as
permitting claims for negligent maintenance or failure to warn under
the guise of a vicarious liability claim.48 “Thus, Yusko contemplates, and
this Court agrees, that claims stemming from the negligent
maintenance of a ship’s premises or failure to warn will be made out
under a direct liability theory, which requires notice.”49
The Eleventh Circuit addressed the enforceability of a forum
selection clause in a cruise ticket, taking into consideration the unique
circumstances of the post COVID-19 world.50 The plaintiff, Paul Turner,
along with his cruise mates, filed a class-action lawsuit following his
cruise aboard the Costa Luminosa, a vessel owned by the defendant,
Costa Crociere S.P.A. Turner, completed a transatlantic voyage during
which they were apparently exposed to COVID-19; when the passengers
disembarked in France, “thirty-six of the seventy-five passengers tested
positive for COVID-19.”51 It turned out that the prior cruise of the Costa
Luminosa carried passengers who were infected with the COVID-19
virus.52

44. Id. at *3.
45. Id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6)).
46. Id. at *8–9.
47. Id. at *9–10.
48. Id. at *10.
49. Id. at *11. The Southern District of Florida previously issued a decision using a
similar vein of reasoning. In Quashen v. Carnival Corp., the court rejected the plaintiff’s
efforts to plead negligent maintenance and failure to warn claims under a vicarious
liability theory. No. 1:20-cv-22299-KMM, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 241507 (S.D. Fla. 2021).
If Plaintiff were permitted to assert a negligent maintenance claim premised
on a vicarious liability theory, that would allow Plaintiff to bypass the notice
requirement simply by identifying an employee involved in Carnival’s mere
creation or maintenance of a defect. Such a ruling would entirely dilute the
notice requirement—which is a mainstay of Federal maritime tort law.
Id. at *52–53.
50. Turner v. Costa Crociere S.P.A., 9 F.4th 1341 (11th Cir. 2021).
51. Id. at 1345.
52. Id. at 1344.
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Turner filed suit in the Southern District of Florida, seeking
damages for himself and the class of fellow passengers aboard the Costa
Luminosa.53 The claims were based on the cruise line’s negligence in
failing to protect the passengers from COVID-19.54 The cruise ticket
contained a forum selection clause requiring claims to be filed in Italy.
The cruise line moved to dismiss Turner’s putative class action on
forum non conveniens grounds, arguing that the forum selection clause
was valid and required Turner’s claims to be litigated in the designated
venue, Italy. The district court granted the motion, and the instant
appeal followed.55
Federal courts routinely enforce forum selection clauses in cruise
tickets, including those which require claims to be filed in a foreign
venue.56 Turner made the novel argument that enforcing the forum
selection clause would be fundamentally unfair, as it would expose him
and other litigants to the previously unknown health hazards
associated with international travel.57 To address this argument, the
cruise line produced an affidavit from an Italian attorney explaining
that litigants are not required to attend routine proceedings in person.58
Even for those events requiring in-person attendance, alternative
arrangements could be made for the appointment of a special attorney
to attend on the litigants’ behalf.59 Turner did not submit any evidence
to counter these points.60 Citing the heavy burden of proof to avoid
enforcement of an otherwise valid forum selection clause, the Eleventh
Circuit had no problem accepting the district court’s findings and
conclusions, and it affirmed the dismissal of Turner’s lawsuit.61
III. JONES ACT SEAMAN’S CLAIMS
The Eleventh Circuit addressed evidentiary considerations,
construing disputed medical evidence in a Jones Act case, with its
decision in Witbart v. Mandara Spa (Haw.), LLC.62 Witbart was

53. Id. at 1345.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1347; see Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991).
57. Turner, 9 F.4th at 1346.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. The appellate court also affirmed the district court’s determination that the
use of the Italian courts did not violate public policy, nor did the lower court err in
applying the forum non conveniens analysis. Id. at 1347–48.
62. 860 F. App’x 175 (S.D. Fla. 2021).
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employed by Mandara Spa and filed a lawsuit under the Jones Act and
General Maritime Law following an injury to her neck and spine.63
After an eight-day bench trial, the district court determined that the
Jones Act employer, Mandara Spa, successfully proved its affirmative
defense, relying on McCorpen v. Central Gulf S.S. Corp.64 The court in
McCorpen held that a seaman who misrepresents a medical condition,
in which false information is relied on by their employer, can forfeit
rights to maintenance and cure.65 The district court determined that
Witbart had a serious, debilitating medical condition that she failed to
disclose to her employer.66
On appeal, Witbart argued the district court failed to construe the
disputed medical evidence in her favor, relying on Vaughan v.
Atkinson,67 a decision by the Supreme Court of the United States.68
Witbart argued that Vaughan requires disputed medical evidence to be
construed in favor of the seaman. The appellate court observed, “[t]his
is an incorrect reading of the case [Vaughan].”69 The Eleventh Circuit
pointed out that “Vaughan resolved an ambiguity in favor of a seaman
regarding the amount of maintenance and cure owed by the
shipowner.”70 Vaughan does not dictate that all evidentiary ambiguities
be resolved in the seaman’s favor. Directing such action would “strip
district courts of their ability to make credibility determinations when
confronted with conflicting evidence during a bench trial.”71
IV. LONGSHORE AND HARBOR WORKER’S CLAIMS
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment in
favor of a vessel owner in an action involving the death of a diver hired
to clean a ship’s hull.72 Brizo, LLC owned the M/V Honey, a 164-foot
yacht. Brizo contracted with Eastern Marine Services, a commercial

63. Id. at 176 (citing 46 U.S.C. § 30104 (2008)). There was no discussion in the
decision about the vessel upon which Witbart was employed.
64. Witbart, 860 F. App’x at 176 (citing McCorpen v. Central Gulf S.S. Corp, 396 F.2d
547 (5th Cir. 1968)).
65. McCorpen, 396 F.2d at 548.
66. Witbart, 860 F. App’x at 176.
67. 369 U.S. 527 (1962).
68. Witbart, 860 F. App’x at 176 (citing Vaughan, 369 U.S. at 527).
69. Id. at 176.
70. Id. (citing Vaughan, 369 U.S. at 532–33).
71. Id. at 176.
72. Brizo, LLC v. Carbajal, No. 20-11204, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 32400, at *1–2 (11th
Cir. 2021).
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diving company, to clean the vessel’s hull.73 On June 21, 2017, Eastern
Marine sent an email to M/V Honey’s captain advising that the
cleaning “‘was coming up approximately 6/26 at 7:00 P.M . . . .’”74 The
email further informed the vessel’s captain that the date was an
estimate, subject to change.75
Eastern Marine sent Luis Gorgonio Ixba to clean the hull of the M/V
Honey.76 However, Ixba arrived at the vessel on June 27, 2017, one day
after the estimated arrival date sent to M/V Honey’s captain.
Tragically, Ixba did not notify the vessel’s crew upon his arrival at the
vessel. He began his underwater cleaning unknown to anyone aboard
the yacht.77 Without knowledge that Ixba was in the water cleaning the
hull, the chief mate started the bow thruster to move the vessel closer
to the dock. Ixba was killed as a result of this action.78
Ixba’s estate filed a wrongful death action in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Florida.79 The vessel owner
filed a complaint for the limitation of liability.80 After discovery in the
federal limitation suit, the district court granted summary judgment in
favor of the vessel owner after first addressing whether or not the
Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA)81
governed the decedent’s claims for negligence.82
The dispositive and controlling fact was undisputed: Ixba did not
alert vessel personnel to his presence.83 The legal argument centered on
whether or not the LHWCA would apply to Ixba’s claim. The duties
owed by a vessel owner to individuals covered by the LHWCA are
narrowly confined by case law.84 The touchstone of all these duties “is
that the vessel crew knows that workers are present to work on the
vessel.”85

73. Id. at *2–3.
74. Id. at *3.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at *3–4.
78. Id. at *4.
79. Id. at *2.
80. Id. (citing 46 U.S.C. §§ 30501–30512 (2006)).
81. 33 U.S.C. §§ 901–980 (1984).
82. Brizo, LLC, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 32400, at *2, *4–5.
83. Id. at *5–6.
84. Id. at *5 (citing Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v. De Los Santos, 451 U.S. 156
(1981) (listing the well-known Scindia duties a vessel owner owes to workers aboard its
vessel)).
85. Id. at *5 (emphasis in original).
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The decedent’s estate argued that the LHWCA’s recreational vessel
exception applied, excluding Ixba from coverage under the LHWCA.
Thus, Ixba’s estate should be allowed to pursue general negligence
claims under the maritime law, “which imposes a general duty of
reasonable care.”86 The M/V Honey was a recreational vessel. The
LHWCA’s scope does not cover individuals employed to repair
recreational vessels.87 However, the exemptions enumerated in this
section apply only to individuals “subject to coverage under a State
workers’ compensation law.”88 There was no evidence in the record
indicating Ixba was covered by any state workers’ compensation law,
and summary judgment in favor of the vessel owner was affirmed.89
V. MARINE INSURANCE
In 2021, the Eleventh Circuit revisited the wake of uncertainty left
by the Supreme Court’s direction that state law applies to marine
insurance contracts in the absence of established maritime precedent.90
The M/Y My Lady was a ninety-two foot Hatteras yacht insured by
Travelers. The hull insurance policy contained two express warranties:
(1) Owners are required to employ a full-time professional captain
approved by Travelers, and (2) owners are required to employ one full
or part-time professional crew member.91 Neither one of these
requirements was followed by the owner of the M/Y My Lady.92
Hurricane Irma approached Florida in September 2017.93 When
efforts to move the vessel to a safe harbor failed, the owner took steps to
shore-up the vessel’s moorings. This effort was to no avail; during the
storm, a dock piling gave way, allowing the yacht to drift into other
pilings. The M/Y My Lady’s hull was eventually punctured, and the
vessel sank.94 It was declared to be a total constructive loss.95

86. Id. at *7–9.
87. 33 U.S.C. § 902(3)(f) (2009). This section includes the definitions relevant to the
LHWCA. It specifically excludes a number of work classifications, including individuals
employed to build or repair recreational vessels.
88. 33 U.S.C. § 902(3).
89. Brizo, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 32400, at *9, *19.
90. Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am. v. Ocean Reef Charters LLC (Travelers I), 996
F.3d 1161 (11th Cir. 2021); Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310
(1955).
91. Travelers I, 996 F.3d at 1163.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
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Travelers filed the instant action and also denied coverage for the
loss, pointing to the breach of the captain and crew warranties cited
above.96 The owner of the vessel, Ocean Reef, argued that Florida’s
“anti-technical statute” should apply, which would forgive breaches of
the warranties if the violations thereof were unrelated to the loss.97 The
district court held that federal maritime law applied to the claim and
that established maritime jurisprudence required strict adherence to
the warranties in the insurance policy. Travelers’s motion for summary
judgment was granted, and the owner filed the instant appeal. 98
The Eleventh Circuit provided a comprehensive overview of the
Supreme Court’s seminal decision on marine insurance, Wilburn Boat
Co. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co.99 In this 1955 opinion, the Supreme
Court “concluded that there was no established federal maritime rule
‘requiring strict fulfillment of marine insurance warranties . . . .’”100
Lower courts were directed to apply state law to marine insurance
contracts in the absence of entrenched federal precedent.101
Consequently, the Eleventh Circuit read Wilburn to require a threshold
determination “if the specific warranty at issue is (or should be) the
subject of a uniform or entrenched federal admiralty rule.”102
In reaching its decision, the district court relied on two cases:
Lexington Insurance Co. v. Cooke’s Seafood,103 and Hilton Oil Transport
v. Jones.104 Both cases involved violations of navigational limit
warranties which exclude coverage even if the breach was unrelated to
the loss. The district court read these cases as establishing a blanket
rule requiring strict adherence to all warranties in marine insurance
policies.105 However, the Eleventh Circuit explained that this holding is
contrary to Wilburn and would “eviscerate” the Supreme Court’s

96. Id.
97. Id. at 1164 (quoting Fla. Stat. § 627.409(2)) (“A breach . . . does not void the policy
or contract, or constitute a defense to a loss thereon, unless such breach or violation
increased the hazard by any means within the control of the insured.”).
98. Id.
99. Travelers I, 996 F.3d at 1164 (citing Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co.,
348 U.S. 310 (1955)).
100. Id. (quoting Wilburn, 348 U.S. at 314).
101. Id. at 1165 (citing Wilburn, 348 U.S. at 314–16).
102. Id. at 1167 (emphasis in original) (quoting Great Lakes Reinsurance (UK) v.
Rosin, 757 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 1257 (S.D. Fla. 2010)).
103. 835 F.2d 1364 (11th Cir. 1988).
104. 75 F.3d 627 (11th Cir. 1996); Travelers I, 996 F.3d at 1167–68.
105. Travelers I, 996 F.3d at 1168.
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directive that there is “no established federal maritime rule requiring
strict fulfillment of all warranties in marine insurance policies.”106
The Eleventh Circuit surveyed maritime jurisprudence for the
specific warranties—captain and crew warranties.107 Finding none, the
court was confined by the Wilburn directive to employ Florida law,
including the state’s anti-technical statute.108 The lower court’s decision
was reversed, and the case was remanded with directions to apply the
Florida statute and consider the relevant issues in light thereof.109
On remand, the district court changed course and granted summary
judgment in favor of the insured.110 The defendant (insured) presented
expert testimony that its storm preparations were reasonable and that
the lack of a full-time captain did not increase the hazard that caused
the vessel’s loss.111 The burden shifted to the insurance company to
demonstrate an issue of material fact. However, Travelers’s request to
use testimony from its rebuttal expert witness was not allowed.112 The
court awarded the insured $2,000,000—the full coverage of the
vessel.113
Note that the Eleventh Circuit specifically invited the Supreme
Court to revisit its decision in Wilburn.114 The Supreme Court may have
the opportunity to address the legacy of confusion created by Wilburn.
It appears that the insurance company filed an appeal to the Eleventh
Circuit from the most recent summary judgment order.
In Great Lakes Insurance SE v. Sunset Watersports, Inc.,115 another
case addressing the enforceability of warranties in marine insurance
policies, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of
underwriters and concluded the subject insurance policies provided no
coverage for multiple personal injuries and wrongful death claims.116
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1168–70.
108. Id. at 1171.
109. Id.
110. Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am. v. Ocean Reef Charters (Travlers II), LLC, No. 18CIV-81270-RAR, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 206429, at *1–2 (S.D. Fla. 2021).
111. Id. at *7.
112. Id. at *7–8.
113. Id. at *9–10.
114. Travelers I, 996 F.3d at 1171. The Eleventh Circuit points out that the Supreme
Court itself has provided little guidance on the Wilburn issue (entrenched precedent
versus state law): “In the 65 years since Wilburn Boat was decided, the Court has cited
the case just 13 times. Only two of those cases are relevant here, and neither one dealt
with an express warranty in a marine insurance policy.” Id. at 1166.
115. No. 20-CIV-61630-WPD, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 215725 (S.D. Fla. 2021).
116. Id. at *3, *12.
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The facts of the case are somewhat confusing because there are
numerous insurance policies covering multiple policy years, along
with four separate personal injury and wrongful death claims.
The first issue was whether misrepresentations or omissions made
in the policy applications would void coverage ab initio under the
doctrine of uberrimae fidei.117 The court recognized the doctrine of
uberrimae fidei was controlling in the Eleventh Circuit.118 This
doctrine imposes the duty of “utmost good faith” on the insured to
identify all facts material to the risk, “regardless of whether the
insurer, underwriter, or application specifically inquires into them.”119
In the instant case, underwriters argued that the insured failed to
disclose multiple losses and claims over several years when it obtained
and renewed the policies at issue.120
Defendants, meanwhile, argued that uberrimae fidei had never
been applied by the Eleventh Circuit in the protection and indemnity
(P&I) context, namely, third-party liability claims.121 This was a
distinction without a difference because New York law and the
applicable policy language obligated full disclosure of risks bearing on
the acceptance or continuance of the insurance in question.122
Ultimately, the court decided there were factual issues precluding
summary judgment on the issue. Both parties presented underwriting
experts who differed on whether the disclosures would have played a
role in issuing the policies in the first place.123 Summary judgment
was denied on this ground, but the court addressed the other
arguments supporting the plaintiff’s position—lack of coverage.124
Specifically, the two wrongful death claimants were transported to
an offshore location by the defendant’s vessel, Party Cat, and then
transferred to a parasail vessel, Parasail V.125 The line parted from
their parasail, causing the unfortunate victims to crash into the ocean
and sustain fatal injuries.126 Underwriters argued that there was no
coverage under the insurance policy issued for the Party Cat because
117. Id. at *10–11.
118. Id. at *12.
119. Id. at *12–13.
120. Id. at *20–22.
121. Id. at *15.
122. Id. at *14. The insurance policies called for application of New York law in the
event maritime law did not apply. Id. at *14 n.7 (quoting choice of law clause found in
policies).
123. Id. at *24–25.
124. Id. at *26.
125. Id. at *28.
126. Id.
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the loss did not arise “as a result of [the] ownership or operation of the
Scheduled Vessel.”127 Again, there was no dispute that the decedents
were not on the Party Cat when their fatal injuries occurred. The
court rejected arguments that coverage existed due to ownership or
operation of the Party Cat.128
There was a second policy which may have applied, presumably
furnishing coverage for losses arising out of the operation of Parasail
V.129 However, this policy included a navigational warranty which
precluded the vessel from traveling more than one mile from the coast
of Florida.130 It was undisputed that the accident occurred outside of
this navigational restriction. Federal maritime law is entrenched and
established because it requires strict and absolute enforcement of
express navigational warranties.131 “In fact, ‘the breach of a
navigation limit warranty bars coverage as a matter of maritime law
even when the breach is unrelated to the loss.’”132
A final claim for coverage of a personal injury claim was denied
because the passenger failed to sign a release before boarding the
insured’s vessel.133 The policies issued to the defendants required that
participants in any activity sign a release prior to boarding a
watercraft. The injured passenger did not sign a release and was
injured while boarding the vessel when she slipped on the gunwale
and hurt her ankle.134 The court deemed the requirement to be
unambiguous and enforced it as written, as required by New York
law.135 “Accordingly, because [the passenger] never signed a release
prior to boarding the Parasail V, and the policy warranted that a
release be signed, the unambiguous language voids coverage for the
Manderson Claim.”136

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id. at *28–29.
Id. at *29, *35.
Id. at *35–36.
Id.
Id. at *36.
Id. at *36–37 (quoting Travelers I, 996 F.3d at 1168).
Id. at *47.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *49.
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VI. MARITIME LIENS
Fine art affixed to the wall of a luxury yacht was held to be an
“appurtenance” of the vessel to which a maritime lien attached.137 The
M/Y Blue Star is a 143-foot luxury yacht. In 2020, the Rybovich Boat
Company arrested the vessel for failure to pay its bills.138 The vessel
was eventually sold at a United States Marshal’s sale, but fourteen
paintings previously secured to the vessel’s interior walls were not
included. Claimants moved to sell the artwork because the sale
proceeds were insufficient to cover all liens. The vessel owner opposed
this effort, arguing that the paintings were his personal property to
which maritime liens did not attach.139
The fundamental question was whether the artwork constituted an
“appurtenance” to the vessel.140 Maritime liens attach not only to a
vessel; all equipment that is “‘essential to the ship’s navigation and
operation, is subject to maritime liens, . . . regardless of who the actual
owner of the equipment may be.’”141
An appurtenance is an item “‘essential to the ship’s navigation,
operation, or mission.’”142 To determine whether an item is an
appurtenance, the court looks to the relationship the item bears to the
service or the work of the vessel.143 The district court distilled a
three-part inquiry to determine whether the artwork constituted an
appurtenance subject to a maritime lien: (1) whether the artwork was
a specifically identifiable item; (2) whether it was used aboard a
specifically identifiable vessel; and (3) whether it was “‘essential to the
vessel’s navigation, operation, or mission.’”144 The first two elements
were not in dispute. The artwork was easily identifiable and was used
aboard the M/Y Blue Star, having been affixed to the vessel’s walls for
at least ten years.145
The final criteria—whether the artwork was essential to the vessel’s
navigation, operation, or mission—was subject to debate.146 The M/Y
137. Rybovich Boat Co., LLC v. M/Y Blue Star, No. 20-80136-CIV-ALTMAN, 2021 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 227511, at *2–3 (S.D. Fla. 2021).
138. Id. at *3.
139. Id. at *4–6.
140. Id. at *5.
141. Id. at *7 (quoting Motor-Servs. Hugo Stamp, Inc. v. M/V Regal Empress, 165 F.
App’x 837, 840 (11th Cir. 2006)).
142. Id. at *8 (quoting Gonzalez v. M/V Destiny Panama, 102 F. Supp. 2d 1352, 1354
(S.D. Fla. 2000)).
143. Id. (citing Anderson v. U.S., 317 F.3d 1235, 1238 (11th Cir. 2003)).
144. Id. at *9 (quoting Gonzalez, 102 F. Supp. 2d at 1356).
145. Id. at *9–11.
146. Id. at *9.
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Blue Star was a “pleasure yacht,” per the court, and its mission was to
“bring pleasure to its occupants.”147 The district court noted that the
artwork was an integral part of the overall aesthetic of the vessel: “It
[complemented] the fully furnished, multi-cabin superyacht’s
wood-paneled interiors, its five marble bathrooms (each with
capacious soaking tubs), its stainless-steel appliances, its lavish
dining room (staffed with a dedicated chef and multiple stewardesses),
and its opulent main deck.”148
The court rejected the defendant’s argument that the artwork did not
assist with the actual operation of the ship.149 Federal courts have long
recognized that appurtenant items can be essential to a ship’s mission
“even though the items have little to do with the ship’s navigation or
operation.”150

147.
148.
149.
150.

Id. at *11, *14.
Id. at *14.
Id. at *11–12.
Id. at *13.

